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Introduction
Since the Conference for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a Cold 
War forum for dialogue between East and 
West, was turned into an Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), very little attention has been 
paid to countries that exercised the 
Organisation’s rotating chairmanships. 
Usually chairmanships were held by small 
Western or Central European nations 
that tried to build the consensus needed 
for the organisation’s decision-making. 
Even when the OSCE became a target of 
attacks by Russia and its allies for what 
they saw as excessive emphasis of the 
organisation on issues of democratic 
elections and human rights, the role 
of the chairmanship was not put under 
the microscope. For, example, outside 
observers who quickly developed views on 
the risks and benefits of the Kazakhstan 
chairmanship barely paid attention to 
the 2007 Belgian OSCE chairmanship. 
Only  the organisation’s then staff had 
insight into that chairmanship’s policy of 
maximum accommodation of Russia and 
minimal support for the organisation’s 
Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR).1  
1 Author’s personal communications with senior 
OSCE staff between 2008 and 2010.
Despite general indifference to the OSCE’s 
work many commentators nevertheless have 
developed an opinion on the Kazakhstan 
OSCE chairmanship bid since it emerged in 
the mid-2000s. Initially, Kazakhstan hoped 
to get the Chairmanship in 2009, but the 
OSCE member states finally agreed at the 
December 2007 OSCE Ministerial Meeting 
in Madrid to grant Kazakhstan the OSCE 
chairmanship in 2010.
This Policy Brief looks at Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship through the prism of the EU’s 
relations with Central Asian states and 
examines what lessons the EU can draw from 
the Kazakhstan chairmanship. It analyses 
the aspects of the Kazakhstan chairmanship 
proponents and sceptics focused on during 
2010. The OSCE Chairmanship and the 
agreement to hold the 2010 OSCE Summit 
in Astana, despite it not having a Summit-
like agenda, were significant ‘carrots’ given 
to Kazakhstan.2 Did these carrots bring any 
results, and is there a reason to offer more 
such carrots to Kazakhstan or to other Central 
Asian states? This Policy Brief deals with these 
questions and is not intended as a ‘balance 
sheet’ of the Kazakhstan OSCE Chairmanship. 
2 In his call for holding of the Summit, the President 
of Kazakhstan offered a vague agenda of ‘topical 
matters on the security agenda in the OSCE 
area of responsibility as well as the situation in 
Afghanistan and issues of tolerance.’ Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, “Summit needed for stagnant OSCE”, 
The Washington Times, January 14, 2010.
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To clarify the subsequent discussions, it first briefly recapitulates 
the arguments made by proponents and sceptics of the 
Kazakhstan OSCE chairmanship bid. 
The proponents, which included the former Soviet States as well 
as most of the Southern European countries such as Spain and 
Italy as well as Germany, argued that the organisation has no 
tradition of denying a chairmanship to states that seek it and 
which have no outstanding territorial disputes with other states. 
They also argued that a denial of Kazakhstan’s bid would only 
accentuate the new divisions in Europe between the East and the 
West and give credibility to the argument often made in Russia 
that the EU is not treating former Soviet Republics as genuine 
partners. The proponents held optimistic views that Kazakhstan’s 
OSCE chairmanship would accelerate further independence 
of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy from Russia’s influence, bring 
Kazakhstan and the whole Central Asian region closer to Europe, 
that it would shine a spotlight on Kazakhstan’s human rights 
record, and would serve as an incentive for domestic reforms. 
On the contrary the sceptics, including many in the US, UK, Czech 
and Swedish governments, among others, felt that Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship would hinder the work of the OSCE’s institutions, 
especially the ODIHR, in areas such as election observation and 
promotion of human rights. Furthermore, they felt that within the 
organisation Kazakhstan’s agenda would be guided by Russia, 
and particularly its drive to conclude a legally-binding European 
Security Treaty along the lines proposed by the Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev, opposed by most of the EU states and the 
US. Moreover, these sceptics believed that Kazakhstan’s poor 
human rights performance and its record of holding questionable 
elections disqualified it from chairing the OSCE and discredited 
its message of democracy and human rights. 
The discussion over the merits of granting Kazakhstan the 
OSCE Chairmanship took place against a background of 
growing pessimism over the OSCE’s role as a pan-European 
security forum. This was after the NATO and EU enlargement, 
the stalemate in resolving ‘frozen conflicts’ in the former Soviet 
states where the OSCE was mandated to play a key role, and 
the backsliding on human rights not only in the eastern part of 
the OSCE region, but also in the West. While the participating 
States have failed to live up to many of the OSCE standards in 
recent years, the OSCE as an organisation took the blame for this 
deterioration.3  The closing of the OSCE mission to Georgia in the 
aftermath of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia 
was just one of the symptoms of the OSCE’s perceived decline.  
Thus, Kazakhstan’s chairmanship bid and the eventual chairmanship 
came at what many believed to be a critical moment for the 
organisation, seemingly raising the stakes of granting chairmanship to 
a country whose own adherence to the OSCE impartiality standards 
have been suspect. While most of the EU states – even those such as 
the Netherlands that traditionally prioritise human rights – eventually 
came to favour the Kazakhstan chairmanship bid, doubts lingered, 
especially in London and Prague as well as in the EU countries’ 
embassies in Kazakhstan.  A clearly expressed consensual view did 
not emerge prior to the 2007 Madrid Ministerial meeting.4 Ultimately 
3 A number of analytical pieces on the OSCE’s decline have been published 
recently.  E.g. Jos Boonstra, OSCE Democracy Promotion: Grinding to a Halt? 
FRIDE, Working Paper 44, October 2007; Vladimir D. Shkolnikov, ‘Missing the 
Big Picture’, Security and Human Rights, 2009, Vol. 4, pp. 294-306. 
4 The support by the Netherlands was expressed by then Foreign Minister 
it was not the EU’s but Washington’s acquiescence to having 
Kazakhstan assume the chairmanship in 2010 – a year later than 
Astana initially proposed – that led to the consensus on this issue 
among the OSCE participating States.
First, the good news: Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship was independent
There is one point which the sceptics got wrong. Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship was not, as feared by many, a proxy for Russia 
and demonstrated that Kazakhstan has developed a strong 
degree of independence in its conduct of foreign policy. Many 
smaller EU states, had they been in the same position in 2010, 
would have been hard-pressed to expend less effort on the 
discussion of Medvedev’s European Security Treaty proposal 
than the Kazakhstani chairmanship. Similarly, Kazakhstan 
made no effort to interfere in the work of the ODIHR or the 
other OSCE Institutions, the Representative on Freedom of 
the Media or the High Commissioner for National Minorities. 
Certainly, the Kazakhstani chairmanship did not fully back 
these institutions by issuing press releases of support, but a 
one year respite from attacks by Russia and its allies was in 
itself useful for these institutions, especially for the ODIHR.5 In 
fact, the timely passage of the OSCE budget for the first time 
in many years as well as Kazakhstan’s effort to ensure that 
its successor, Lithuania, would get the 2011 budget passed 
on time were immensely useful for the smooth running of the 
organisation.
Kazakhstan not only abstained from interfering in the work of the 
ODIHR, which for many EU states was a ‘red line’, but it also held a 
significant number of various human dimension meetings and relied 
more heavily than some other chairmanships on the ODIHR for sub-
stantive inputs and for the selection of speakers at these conferences. 
The only blemish came when Kazakhstan appeared to limit access 
of exile groups from Turkmenistan to some of the OSCE meetings 
in deference to the hostility to these groups from Ashgabat officials.6   
The real objective of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship was holding a 
summit of heads of OSCE states in Astana. OSCE summits have 
not been held since the 1999 Summit in Istanbul due to the ab-
sence of prospects for consensus and therefore the lack of states 
willing to foot the bill for an event likely to result in failure.  Yet Ka-
zakhstan was not deterred by this, and from the beginning of 2010 
persistently pushed for a Summit to be held in the new Kazakh-
stani capital in the year of President Nazarbayev’s 70th birthday. 
While many EU states initially felt that no summit should be held 
without substance, the EU did not develop a definite position on 
the issue.  Rather, it waited for Washington to develop a stance 
on the summit and then followed the US’s lead when the Obama 
administration decided mid-year to agree to hold a summit with 
limited substance in Astana in December 2010.  The EU joined 
Bernard Bot during his visit to Kazakhstan in May 2006.
5 E.g. Kazakhstan made no efforts to ‘task’ the ODIHR with writing 
meaningless reports and papers whose purpose was to justify its activities 
in the face of Russia’s attacks as was the case with some of the previous 
Chairmanships.
6 In particular, the difference of opinions on access of Turkmen exiles 
between Kazakhstan, on one hand, and between the EU and the US, on the 
other, came to the surface during the Warsaw segment of the OSCE Review 
Conference in September-October 2010. Ultimately the Chairmanship left the 
decision to the OSCE Secretary General who allowed the Turkmen exiles to 
participate in the meeting.
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this consensus to the surprise of its more sceptical members. 
While not all heads of states or Governments attended the 
summit, the very fact that it was held in Astana was portrayed 
domestically and in some international quarters as a success of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. 
While a broad action plan on the future of the OSCE was not 
achieved, the Astana Declaration contains surprisingly strong 
language on human rights and the role of the civil society.7 This 
was the unexpected outcome of an unusual chairmanship.
The rest of the story: an absence of strategic 
gains
One of the hopes that optimists pinned on Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship was its potential ability to bring Central Asian 
states’ foreign policies closer to Europe. However, this did not 
turn out to be the case. In fact, throughout its chairmanship, 
Kazakhstan had a difficult time securing consensus for its 
plans from its neighbour and regional rival, Uzbekistan. Behind 
the scenes, Uzbekistan had been questioning the Kazakhstan 
OSCE chairmanship bid as a public relations stunt. In 2010 
Uzbekistan repeatedly stated its scepticism about the idea 
of the OSCE summit. Its President, Islam Karimov, was one 
of two no-shows among heads of former Soviet states at the 
summit. hardly a demonstration of interest in the OSCE values 
or OSCE-wide comprehensive security.8   
But it was Kazakhstan chairmanship’s handling of the crisis 
in Kyrgyzstan that afforded it the greatest opportunity to bring 
greater OSCE influence to Central Asia. As the UN and the 
EU took a hands-off approach to several phases of the Kyrgyz 
crisis, the OSCE had an opportunity to address the events in 
the impoverished Central Asian country. The most significant 
accomplishment of Kazakhstan was to negotiate the departure 
from Kyrgyzstan of the deposed President Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
whose continued presence in the country risked flaming unrest in 
the South of the country. However, Kazakhstan’s accomplishments 
with regard to Kyrgyzstan ended there. Following the overthrow 
of Bakiev, Kazakhstan closed its border with Kyrgyzstan for 
weeks, in this way choking off Kyrgyzstan from needed supplies. 
And getting Bakiev out of Kyrgyzstan did not stop ethnic strife 
and bloodshed in June 2010 in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The OSCE 
High Commissioner for National Minorities, Knut Vollebaek 
characterised the events as ‘attempted ethnic cleansing’, as a 
significant number of ethnic Uzbeks living in Southern Kyrgyzstan 
had to flee their homes in fear of attacks by the ethnic Kyrgyz. 
The OSCE could not come up with a more imaginative action 
than to use its controversial police training programme as an 
anchor for its crisis response. The OSCE agreed to deploy 
an unarmed police monitoring group in Kyrgyzstan, but the 
deployment faced delays due to the resistance – real or 
perceived – by the ethnic Kyrgyz in the South. It is not certain 
that any other chairmanship would have handled this crisis 
more convincingly. But what is important to emphasise is the 
dashing of the hopes of some proponents of the Kazakhstan 
chairmanship that Kazakhstan would use its knowledge of 
7 See paragraph 6 of the Astana Commemorative Declaration at http://www.
osce.org/mc/73962.
8 Moldova was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, due to the national 
elections in that country coinciding with the Summit.
the region to elevate the OSCE’s – and therefore Europe’s 
– standing in Central Asia. The OSCE’s response to the 
Kyrgyzstan crisis was lacklustre and gave additional 
arguments to the detractors of the OSCE and especially of 
the organisation’s ability to press for the implementation of 
its standards in Central Asia. Regrettably, Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship did nothing to dispel this perception.
The Kazakhstan chairmanship disappointed most on the 
domestic scene. Expectations that the chairmanship would 
provide impetus for domestic reform were not fulfilled. 
Following the granting of the chairmanship to Kazakhstan 
at the end of 2007, the modest steps forward in the field of 
human rights and democracy not only stopped, but the country 
started moving backwards. Independent internet sites were 
hacked or blocked, distribution of opposition newspapers 
where impeded and new legal barriers to registration of 
political parties were put in place.9 The single-party Parliament 
in which neither of the two chambers was even fully elected 
continued to be subservient to the executive branch, while 
further restrictions were placed on freedom of assembly. 
But the international community was especially appalled by 
the continued imprisonment of Kazakhstan’s leading human 
rights defender, Yevgeniy Zhovtis. 
Many independent observers testify that the September 2009 
trial of Zhovtis for involuntary vehicular manslaughter was 
marred by procedural violations and that a four-year prison 
sentence was excessively harsh and possibly politically 
motivated. The EU made a number of statements on Zhovtis’s 
case in late 2009 and early 2010, but seemed to give up after 
a personal appeal by US President Obama to Kazakhstan’s 
leader Nursultan Nazarbayev did not lead to Zhovtis’ release 
or a reduction of his sentence, much to the chagrin of the 
international human rights community.10  
The beginning of 2011 saw the worst fears in the field of elections 
and political pluralism materialised. A rash and, by all accounts 
staged, petition campaign to extend Nazarbayev’s presidential term 
until 2020 gathered a large number of signatures in an unrealistically 
short period of time. Nazarbayev used the Constitutional Council 
to reject this idea, but instead called snap Presidential elections. At 
the time of writing the presidential campaign is going ahead without 
any credible opposition candidate. Some of the opposition decided 
to boycott the elections due to the manifestly uneven playing field.11 
The idea that more presidential terms for the 70-year old Nazarbayev 
are needed for stability is tenuous at best. To put it bluntly, the OSCE 
Chairmanship resulted in the curtailment of civil and political rights for 
Kazakhstan’s population.  If the European supporters of Kazakhstan’s 
bid believed that the Chairmanship would reduce the values gap 
between the EU and Kazakhstan, they grossly miscalculated.
Some diplomats believe that had the Western countries not 
supported Kazakhstan’s chairmanship bid and especially 
9 For a litany of human rights problems in Kazakhstan see, for example, 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2011: Kazakhstan, available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/kazakhstan.
10 E.g. see the EU statement on the case against human rights defender 
Evgeniy Zhovtis at the OSCE Permanent Council No. 808 Vienna, 6 May 2010 
at http://www.delvie.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_osce/eu_statements/2010/May/
PC%20no.808%20-%20EU%20on%20HR%20defender%20E.Zhovtis.pdf
11 Birgit Brauer, ‘Kazakhstan’s Leading Opposition Party Azat Boycotts 
Upcoming Presidential Elections,’ The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor Volume 8 Issue 32, February 15, 2011.
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the holding of the OSCE Summit in Astana, it would not have 
cooperated with the West on issues of transit and over flights 
related to Afghanistan.   However, it can be argued that the OSCE 
summit issue actually introduced an additional layer of complexity 
into Western negotiations on Afghanistan. If the OSCE summit 
was not on the political agenda, it is hard to imagine Kazakhstan 
not assisting the West with regard to Afghanistan, as a peaceful 
and well-governed Afghanistan is in Kazakhstan’s interests. The 
existence of the OSCE summit issue simply handed Kazakhstan 
additional leverage over the West. 
The same argument can be extended to the issue of deliveries 
of Kazakhstan’s energy to Europe. The diversification of energy 
buyers is in Kazakhstan’s interests and the OSCE Chairmanship 
was simply an extraneous issue that entered calculations of some 
in the West who believed that without granting the chairmanship 
or agreeing to hold the Summit in Astana, they would not be able 
to conclude energy contracts with Kazakhstan. 
For the EU countries, the differences between the sceptics 
and proponents of the Kazakhstan chairmanship came once 
again to the surface at the Astana Summit in December 2010. 
In the waning hours of the summit it appeared that it would 
not produce a final document, largely due to the reluctance 
to accept the status quo with regard to the state of ‘frozen 
conflicts’ by some EU members such as the Czech Republic 
and Romania. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi delivered 
a passionate speech in which he praised Kazakhstan’s 
achievements and Nazarbayev personally and called for the 
adoption of the summit’s final document in order not to have the 
summit end in an embarrassing failure for Kazakhstan’s leader. 
Finally, the summit adopted a Commemorative Declaration but 
failed to produce a concrete Plan of Action to deal with the key 
challenges in the OSCE region, especially the ‘frozen conflicts’ 
in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.12 This compromise 
was symbolic of the entire Kazakhstan chairmanship: both the 
proponents and the sceptics could point to evidence supporting 
their views. 
The mixed results of the OSCE Kazakhstan Chairmanship 
ultimately do little to clarify how the EU should approach 
Central Asia. Therefore the debates within the EU are likely to 
continue between those countries who believe that the Union 
should prioritise human rights in its relations with Central Asia 
and those who believe that energy considerations along with 
the region’s proximity to Afghanistan are primary factors which 
should shape those relations. Paradoxically, both camps can 
interpret the record of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in ways that 
support their respective positions. 
The difficulty with any OSCE Chairmanship bid is the lack of 
criteria and procedures in the organisation to review whether 
any participating state is ‘fit’ to hold it. And, perhaps ultimately 
Kazakhstan’s chairmanship bid attracted excessive attention 
and even excessive ‘strategic’ calculations. In contrast, the 
decision reached at the end of 2010 to award the 2013 OSCE 
Chairmanship to Ukraine was made with barely a discussion 
despite the deteriorating human rights situation in that country. 
However, the Kazakhstan chairmanship showed what can and 
12 Displeasure with outcomes of the Summit is clearly visible in interpretive 
statements to the Astana Declaration made by Romania and the Czech 
Republic. See Attachments 4 and 5 to the Astana Declaration at http://www.
osce.org/mc/74985.
cannot be expected from an OSCE Chairmanship held by a 
former Soviet country. Therefore, a realistic assessment of 
how the EU could view Kazakhstan’s chairmanship can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Kazakhstan’s chairmanship was not strongly influenced by 
Russia or its other CIS allies;
• The chairmanship served as an ‘armistice’ period in the OSCE 
and in heated debates over the role of human rights and 
democracy issues in security of Europe, and gave the embattled 
OSCE institutions such as ODIHR an opportunity to concentrate 
on fulfilling their mandate rather than thwarting outside attacks;
• Kazakhstan’s chairmanship did not provide the OSCE or 
the EU with an additional ‘window to Central Asia’. No new 
crisis response mechanisms emerged in the wake of the 
Kyrgyzstan crisis of 2010;
• The Astana Summit was marginally useful in that the 
declaration it produced reaffirmed commitment to human 
rights and democracy as essential for security of the whole 
OSCE region, and not an internal matter;
• The human rights situation in Kazakhstan deteriorated in the 
run-up to and in the aftermath of the Chairmanship leaving the 
values gap between that country and West larger than ever.
As a final remark, a few words are in order on the use of carrots 
in Western relations with Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship bid and especially the celebration of the Astana 
summit primarily served the domestic public relations agenda for 
President Nazarbayev. Chairmanships in international organisations 
and holding high-level meetings in Kazakhstan and other Central 
Asian countries are intended to show domestic audiences that the 
countries leaderships enjoy strong international support and are 
accepted as peers by leaders of Western democracies. A similar 
carrot was extended to Uzbekistan in 2003 when the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development decided to hold its prestigious 
annual meeting in Tashkent rather than at the regular venue in London 
in hopes that such a carrot would serve as an incentive for reform. 
The meeting fell short of expectations as Uzbekistan President 
Islam Karimov even demonstratively took off his headphones when 
Western speakers took up the topic of human rights.13 The Andijan 
massacre came two years after the carrot of playing host to a 
prominent international meeting was consumed by Tashkent. 
International organisations holding important events in Central 
Asian countries where these countries are members is probably 
inevitable due to the political logic of these organisations. 
Given the fact that Central Asian regimes use these events 
for public relations purposes, perhaps a paradoxical lesson of 
the Kazakhstan OSCE chairmanship is to avoid treating  these 
events as carrots – which will only be devoured – or even as 
something special. This only adds to the public relations ploys of 
Central Asian leaders. Rather, the West would be well advised to 
treat these events or chairmanships as something unavoidable 
and even – horribile dictu - mundane.  
13 A short account of this event is available on http://greatreporter.com/
mambo/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=69
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